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Abstract: We study farm real estate values in the Barnett Shale (Texas) and the northeastern part 
of the Marcellus Shale (Pennsylvania and New York). Shale gas development caused 
appreciation in both areas but the effect was much larger in the Marcellus, suggesting broader 
ownership of oil and gas rights by surface owners. In both regions, most appreciation occurred 
when land was leased for drilling, not when drilling and production boomed. We find evidence 
that effects vary by farm type, which may reflect a correlation between farm type and the 
presence of oil and gas rights. 
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Success in extracting oil and natural gas from shale formations through horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing has led to a wave of drilling in shale-rich states like Texas and Pennsylvania. 
Drilling in shale formations has varied consequences, creating jobs while also affecting 
residential property values and human health (Weber 2012; Hill 2013; Olmstead et al. 2013; 
Weber 2013; Brown 2014; Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014).  
 Several recent studies look at the effect of shale gas development on residential housing 
values to estimate the cost of environmental and human health risks, real or perceived 
(Muehlenbachs et al. 2013; Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014). The value of residential 
properties primarily reflects the value of buildings. The value of properties like farms, in 
contrast, mostly reflects the value of undeveloped land. The link between shale development (or 
the potential for it) and land values remains unexplored aside from two studies that address it 
tangentially. Weber, Brown, and Pender (2013) found a positive correlation between farm real 
estate values and lease and royalty payments from oil, gas, or wind activities, while Borchers, 
Ifft, and Keuthe (2014) found a weak negative correlation between county-level oil production 
and farm-level pasture values.      
 We use self-reported farm real estate values from five Censuses of Agriculture (1992, 
1997, 2002, 2007, 2012) to estimate how natural gas development affected farm real estate 
values, which primarily consist of the value of undeveloped land. We focus on two regions that 
have had extensive shale development as of 2012: the Barnett Shale in Texas and the 
northeastern part of the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania. We use these data to inform several 
questions related to shale gas development.  
First, we use estimates of the effect of development on farm real estate values as an 
indication of the ubiquity of split estates – properties where the rights to oil and gas are owned 
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by someone other than the land owner. As extracting natural gas from shale formations becomes 
profitable, the oil and gas rights appreciate. We expect shale development to cause greater land 
appreciation in areas with few split estates than in areas with many split estates. Split estates 
matter because they imply that the person bearing most of the disamenities from drilling – the 
person living on the surface near the well – is different than the person negotiating the leasing 
terms for drilling. It is also likely that the greater the frequency of split estates, the less royalty 
income captured by local residents.  
Second, with our long panel data we can see how farm real estate values changed during 
the leasing and development periods. We expect farm real estate values to change over time. As 
natural gas is withdrawn, the subsurface rights grant access to fewer and fewer resources, 
causing properties with subsurface rights to gradually decline in value. A decline in value to 
below pre-development levels would indicate a long-term cost of having wells and related 
infrastructure on or near a property, assuming that farmers did not invest royalty income in land 
improvements. We note here that the effect of shale development on farm real estate values that 
we estimate is a medium to long-term net effect. Our data do not permit separating competing 
positive and negative effects of drilling, and with farms observed at five-year intervals, our 
estimates primarily reflect effects that persist for several years. As such the estimates are not 
comparable to studies that estimate the change in real estate values from shortly before to shortly 
after the drilling of a well.   
Lastly, we leverage the data to see how drilling affects the suitability of land for a variety 
of uses. Residential values, which prior research has considered (e.g. Gopalakrishnan and 
Klaiber 2014; Muehlenbachs et al. 2013), reveal how drilling affects a property’s attractiveness 
for use as a residence. Properties with more land reveal how drilling affects their suitability for 
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the nonresidential purposes that give it value. Properties with a house and barn and 100 acres, for 
example, are used as a residence but also for growing crops, raising livestock, and recreation. 
Because of potential effects on local water quality, drilling may lower the value of land dedicated 
to livestock but not the value of cropland. Similarly, land used primarily for recreation may be 
more sensitive to the environmental, health, and landscape consequences of drilling.  
Data limitations prevent us from clean and concrete conclusions. Our findings, 
nonetheless, provide greater understanding of all three topics and should help further research in 
this area. First, we find a small positive effect of shale development in both the Barnett (Texas) 
and the Marcellus (Pennsylvania) but the effect is much larger in the Marcellus, suggesting that 
split estates are far less common there. This conclusion is consistent with Fitzgerald (2014) who 
finds that local ownership of mineral rights is more than two times higher in Pennsylvania than 
in Texas.   
For both regions, most appreciation occurred when land was leased for drilling. Higher 
values then persisted through the drilling period, indicating a net positive effect of drilling 
through the last year of our analysis, 2012. This indicates that long-term disamenities that affect 
farm real estate values have not yet been large enough to outweigh the effects of development 
that are positively related to farm values. 
Regarding different effects for different properties, we find evidence that shale 
development caused real estate in  residence farms – those with limited agricultural sales and 
whose owners have a primary occupation other than farming (not to be confused with “small” 
farms) – to appreciate more than real estate in nonresidence farms. This finding holds for both 
regions. Weaker evidence suggests that livestock farm real estate appreciated less or even lost 
value. Both findings potentially reflect a correlation between farm type and the presence of oil 
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and gas rights – a possibility that underscores the value of information on oil and gas right 
ownership when studying the effect of shale energy development on property values.   
 
Shale Gas Development and Land Values: The Perils Facing the Researcher 
 
Limited Data 
Property sales data with detailed land characteristics, including whether the subsurface rights 
were conveyed in the sale, would provide a firm foundation to quantify how shale gas 
development affects the value of oil and gas rights and surface rights. Standard sales data, 
however, typically lacks information about the conveyance of oil and gas rights. They also only 
include properties sold, and if the researcher wants to control for time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics, she must further limit her study to properties sold twice during the study period. 
This is less of a challenge when considering residential properties with little land because they 
are so numerous. The same is not true of properties consisting primarily of land, which are fewer 
and only a small fraction of them are sold in a given year. Many are only sold once in a lifetime, 
let alone twice in a researcher’s study period. The problem may be exacerbated by oil and gas 
development if development slows land market turnover. 
A researcher using survey data asking property owners for market values may avoid the 
small sample pitfall of sales data but may stumble into others. Surveys – such as the Census of 
Agriculture, which we use – may provide panel data on more proprieties in a given area. 
However, unless the data was collected with subsurface issues in mind, the questionnaire 
probably did not ask landowners if they own the oil and gas rights to their land, and the Census 
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of Agriculture is no exception. Even if landowners own the rights, they may not report them in 
the market value of their land if the questionnaire lacks explicit instructions.    
  
Heterogeneous Effects 
Oil and gas rights aside, shale development may have different effects on different types of land. 
This increases the researcher’s data needs to include the characteristics associated with the 
distinct effects. Pope and Goodwin (1984) argued that rural land has value because of its 
agricultural productivity but also because it can be enjoyed for its own sake – what the authors 
label as a consumptive component of value. We might expect the value of land whose demand 
comes primarily from people who want to escape city life and enjoy the outdoors to be more 
sensitive to the disamenities of drilling. If instead the land is used for growing crops, drilling 
should matter less as long as it does not affect yields. We may also expect heterogeneous effects 
for different types of agricultural land. Beef cattle and dairy cows require quality water. If 
drilling through the water table muddies a spring used to water cows, it may reduce the value of 
the property for use as a livestock farm. For crop farms, muddy spring water may not affect 
productivity, especially if irrigation is not used.  
 
A Moving Target  
The effect of a property being located over a shale formation will change with time, making it 
hard to interpret estimates. Suppose that during the initial leasing period the land inside of a 
formation appreciates more than land just outside the formation, but the price differential 
declines as development matures. The natural resource economist might say the finding reflects 
7 
 
the decline in the resource stock; the environmental economist points to it as evidence of 
environmental disamenities. Both could be true.  
We expect the difference in land values across shale and nonshale areas to vary over time 
for at least three reasons. First, to the extent that subsurface rights are incorporated in land 
values, changes in the quantity or price of the oil or gas in the ground will cause changes in land 
values. Second – and perhaps most important in the short term – drilling reveals information 
about the energy richness of an area. Wells drilled in some parts of all the major U.S. shale 
formations have yielded disappointing results. After acquiring 84,000 acres in the Utica Shale in 
2012, BP America saw disappointing results from test wells and decided to abandon 
development and sell the acreage in 2014 (Seeley 2014).  As wells generate knowledge, 
investment (and therefore production, royalties, and the value of subsurface rights) dries up in 
one area and flows to another. Third, disamenities change over time. Initially wells are drilled, 
creating noise and truck traffic, both of which subside as drilling slows. In time, however, other 
disamenities may emerge as the well cement cracks and allows gas or liquids to migrate 
underground. Since we are able to track land values only at 5-year intervals over time, our 
estimates of the net effect of shale development on land values will reflect primarily longer-term 
disamenities, as we are unable to capture any short-term disamenities.  
 
What We Hope to  Learn from Self-Reported Market Values 
Despite the perils presented, self-reported land value data can be creatively leveraged to inform 
four questions.  
Do self-reported land values incorporate subsurface rights at all?  
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For an answer, we look at two regions and see if shale development’s effect on land values is 
larger in the one with fewer split estates (Pennsylvania) than the one with more split estates 
(Texas). Fitzgerald (2014) shows a local mineral ownership rate of 66 percent for Pennsylvania, 
which he measured by the percent of leases where the mineral lessor was a resident of the county 
of the lease. In Texas, on the other hand, only 28 percent of minerals were locally owned. While 
nonlocal ownership is not equivalent to split estates, the two should be highly correlated, since 
split estates occur when someone who owns and potentially lives on a parcel sells oil and gas 
rights to someone who does not live there. Alternatively, a split can happen when a property 
owner moves and sells a property but retains the oil and gas rights.  
 Oil and gas rights in shale areas acquired substantial value as it became clear that shale 
gas could be profitably extracted. If the increase in the value of rights does not cause greater land 
appreciation in Pennsylvania than in Texas, then it suggests that land owners typically do not 
include the value of their oil and gas rights in their self-reported land values. 
How does the net effect of development change during the leasing and drilling periods?  
For both regions, our data covers the period when most leasing occurred and the period when 
drilling boomed. In Texas the data also include the period of declining drilling. As long as the 
number of split estates did not change substantially, changes in land values will reflect the net 
effect of drilling over time.  
How common are split estates?  
Quantile regressions permit estimating different effects of shale development based on whether a 
property appreciated more or less than what we would predict given its observed characteristics. 
Because we do not control for oil and gas right ownership, properties with the rights should have 
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larger residuals because they should have appreciated more than other properties with similar 
observed characteristics but without the rights. In areas where most estates are split, we expect 
appreciation to be confined to the upper quartiles. We also note, however, that only observing 
appreciation in the upper quartiles could reflect unobserved differences in resource richness 
within shale areas. Not all properties within a shale area will be profitable to drill. Such 
properties will not appreciate much, even if the surface owner has the oil and gas rights. 
How has shale gas development affected the value of rural residence and livestock properties 
relative to other properties?  
Land derives value from what it produces, with more productive land being more 
valuable. Shale gas development may affect land values by affecting land productivity. Suppose 
that the technology f is applied to land to produce y. If land is paid a rent 𝜋 that equals its 
marginal value product, then the difference in rental rates for land in shale and nonshale areas 
will be given by 
(1)   𝜋𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒=1 − 𝜋𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒=0 = 𝑝𝑦[𝑓
′(𝑙|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 1) − 𝑓′(𝑙|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 0)] 
If the price of land is the discounted value (at rate r) of an infinite stream of rent payments, then 
(1) can be written as 
(2)  𝑝𝑙
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒=1 − 𝑝𝑙
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒=0  =
𝑝𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝
𝑟
[𝑓′(𝑙|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 1) − 𝑓′(𝑙|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 0)]. 
Equation (2) shows how the effect of shale gas development on the price of land reflects changes 
in land productivity: 𝑓′(𝑙|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 1) − 𝑓′(𝑙|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 0). 
Different types of land presumably have been put to their most productive uses – to grow 
crops, pasture livestock, or provide recreation. The output used to measure productivity may 
therefore be a consumptive good such as a place to enjoy the outdoors or a traditional output 
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such as corn. We hypothesize that compared to agriculturally-intensive farms, farms used mainly 
as a residence property will appreciate less from development because their value depends more 
on producing environmental or aesthetic goods, which drilling potentially degrades. After all, 
many people buy a country property to enjoy fresh air and a bucolic landscape. Under this 
hypothesis, the productivity of land in a residence farms (subscript res) decreases more than that 
of land in production agriculture (subscript ag):   
(3)  𝑓′(𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑠|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 1) − 𝑓
′(𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑠|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 0)<𝑓
′(𝑙𝑎𝑔|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 1) − 𝑓
′(𝑙𝑎𝑔|𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 0) 
Similarly, we expect farms engaged primarily in raising livestock to value clean water more 
than other farms because they would suffer greater losses if drilling contaminated the farm’s 
water source. Bamberger and Oswald (2012), for example, document cases where waste water 
leakage from drilling and other drilling-related factors affected livestock health in drilling areas. 
If the frequency of split estates is not correlated with agricultural decisions, estimating separate 
effects for different types of properties should provide credible information about the 
heterogeneous effects of shale development on the productivity of land in different uses. 
 
Study Regions, Periods, and Data 
We assess the effects of shale gas development on farm real estate values in the Barnett Shale in 
Texas and the northeastern part of the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania. The Barnett Shale is 
where horizontal drilling and high volume hydraulic fracturing were first applied on a large 
scale. We exploit the sharp edge of the Barnett Shale, comparing farms in four counties wholly 
inside the Shale to farms in four counties just outside of it. For the Pennsylvania analysis, we 
compare farms on either side of the northeastern Pennsylvania-New York border, focusing on the 
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three most gas abundant Pennsylvania counties and the four adjacent counties inside New York 
(Figure 1).  
Development of the Barnett Shale began in the early 2000s, with leasing, which preceded 
permitting, occurring in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Figure 2). The number of well permits 
peaked in 2007 and 2008 when more than 400 permits were approved (and subsequently drilled) 
each year in each shale county. In contrast, the nonshale comparison counties in Figure 1, which 
were almost entirely outside of the shale, had an average of 7 permits approved per county in 
2008.  
Development of the Marcellus Shale in northeastern Pennsylvania counties of Tioga, 
Bradford, and Susquehanna occurred later, with much leasing occurring during the 2005-2008 
period. Drilling then grew rapidly from 2008 to 2011, with the average number of 
unconventional wells drilled per county per year increasing from 24 to 291. In adjacent counties 
in New York, there was very modest drilling over the entire period.  
The lack of drilling in New York reflects various political and environmental 
considerations leading to regulatory roadblocks to hydraulic fracturing in the state. Part of the 
watershed supplying New York City with drinking water sits atop the Marcellus Shale. The New 
York City Department of Environmental Protection is opposed to hydraulic fracturing, arguing 
that it “poses an unacceptable threat to the unfiltered water supply of 9 million New Yorkers” 
(NYC DEP 2009). Continual delays in revising environmental standards have imposed a de facto 
moratorium on hydraulic fracturing since 2008. By the fall of 2008, the NY Department of 
Environmental Conservation had received less than a dozen permit applications for high volume 
fracking of horizontal wells and had approved none of them (NY DEC 2008). Afterwards the 
Department of Environmental Conservation continued to postpone issuing regulations suitable 
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for high volume hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, precluding the use of the technology 
through the end of our latest study year, 2012.  
While no wells were drilled in NY, the comparison of northeastern PA to the NY border 
counties is of a different nature than inside and outside the Barnett shale in TX, since 
southwestern NY is still within the Marcellus shale and drilling may occur in the future. To the 
extent that landowners in NY have incorporated an expectation of future shale development into 
their self-assessed land values, we would be underestimating the impact of shale development on 
land values. We can interpret our estimates as serving a lower bound of the potential shale 
development impact. 
Since our variables of interest are land value and property tax payments, we are not 
particularly concerned about spillover effects, which would be more of an issue in an analysis of 
shale development impacts on the labor market or residential housing market. Demand for 
temporary housing from shale workers would boost the sale or rental price of apartments and 
single family homes outside the Barnett shale area or on the NY side of the border, but this 
should have little effect on the demand for multiple-acre farms.  
 
Data 
We use farm-level data from the Censuses of Agriculture conducted in 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 
and 2012. In the Census the National Agricultural Statistics Service attempts to collect basic 
information on all farms in the U.S. Because of the broad USDA definition of a farm – a place 
that has sold or has the potential to have $1,000 in agricultural sales in a year – many places 
enumerated as a farm have little or no agricultural production and in most cases are best 
described as rural residence properties. Consequently, the properties covered in the Census of 
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Agriculture account for a surprisingly large share of the land in the U.S. The 2007 Census of 
Agriculture showed that 55 percent of the nonurban land of the 48 lower states was owned or 
operated by farms (ERS-USDA 2013). 
Our variable of interest is the self-reported market value of the land and buildings owned 
by the farm divided by the total acres owned. We employ other variables collected through the 
Census, including the farm’s sales by commodity type and whether the farm operator lives on the 
farm. Because of undercoverage and nonresponse in the Census of Agriculture, all farms have a 
statistical weight indicating how many farm it represents in the population. We use this weight in 
our empirics.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of farms observed in at least two 
Census of Agriculture between 1992 and 2012 and received the version of the questionnaire 
asking for farm real estate values. The number of farms in 2007 and 2012 is much higher than in 
prior years because all farms in 2007 and 2012 received the questionnaire collecting farm real 
estate values. Because we estimate different effects of shale development for residence farms and 
livestock farms, which we define later, we also report the number and percent of the sample each 
group represents.  
 
Shale Development and Farm Real Estate Appreciation: Empirical Approach and Findings  
We estimate how the average logarithmic of per acre farm real estate values changed over time 
in areas with and without extensive shale gas development. Letting Shale be a dummy variable 
indicating the area that had extensive development by 2012 and 𝑌𝑡 be a dummy variable 
indicating a specific year, we estimate 
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(4)   ln(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒)𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑌𝑡
𝑡=2012
𝑡=1997
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑡(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖
𝑡=2012
𝑡=1997
𝑥 𝑌𝑡) + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
 In this specification the 𝛽𝑡 terms show how the difference between farm real estate values 
two has changed over time, conditional on year (𝑌𝑡) and farm (𝜑𝑖) fixed effects. For the year 
fixed effects, the excluded year is 1992 (the model is estimated using data from the 1992, 1997, 
2002, 2007, and 2012 Censuses of Agriculture). The farm fixed effect implies that only farms 
observed in at least two Censuses contribute to identification of parameters other than the farm 
fixed effect.  
 Our identification strategy follows other studies on extractive booms that exploit 
changing macro conditions (prices or technology) that affected different regions based on a fixed 
characteristic such as the region’s initial share of earnings from mining (e.g. Black, Mckinnish, 
and Sanders 2005; Marchand 2012). In the case of the Barnett, geology is the characteristic used 
to delineate shale and nonshale farms; for the Marcellus the Pennsylvania-New York border, 
which corresponds to different policy regimes, provides the delineation. Identification of the 
effect of shale development rests on the assumption that time trends that affect farm real estate 
values did not affect areas that eventually had shale development (Shale=1) differently than areas 
that never had development (Shale=0).  
 The assumption of similar time trends is not unassailable. The housing boom of the mid 
2000s, for example, may have affected farm real estate values in New York border counties 
differently than those on the Pennsylvania side. But given the similar proximity to urban areas of 
shale and nonshale counties in the Barnett and those on the PA-NY border, we believe that this is 
unlikely. Moreover, the empirical results will show that farms in the different groups 
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experienced a similar trend in appreciation prior to shale development, providing a reason to 
expect similar trends in the absence of development.  
 
Do self-reported land values incorporate subsurface rights at all? 
We find evidence that to some extent, farmers include their oil and gas rights in the self-reported 
value of their farm real estate. For the Barnett Shale, where split estates are more common, 
natural gas development had a small positive effect on farm real estate values over time (Table 
2). This is evidenced by the coefficients on the Shale x Yt interaction terms. In the northeastern 
part of the Marcellus Shale, where split estates are less common, we find much greater 
appreciation in the Pennsylvania counties, which experienced intense leasing and drilling, 
compared to adjacent counties on the New York side. At a similar stage of development (2012 in 
Pennsylvania and 2007 in the Barnett), the estimated shale effect for farms in the Marcellus is a 
48 percent increase (0.39 log points) in real estate values compared to a 9 percent increase in the 
Barnett. 
 In addition to statistics presented in Fitzgerald (2014) we provide further evidence that 
split estates are common in Texas. In Texas, oil and gas rights are treated as real property like 
land and houses. Once an oil or gas well begins producing, the rights associated with it are 
assessed a value annually, upon which the owner pays local property taxes.
1
 Weber, Burnett, and 
Xiarchos (2014) show how the oil and gas property tax base increased by more than $80,000 per 
student in Barnett Shale school districts relative to districts just outside of the shale. The Census 
of Agriculture collects information on all property taxes paid by farmers. If they commonly own 
their oil and gas rights, we should see an increase in property taxes paid per acre owned in shale 
                                                 
1
 More details on oil and gas property tax assessments in Texas can be found through the Tarrant Appraisal District 
website (www.tad.org) and in particular: 
https://www.tad.org/ftp_data/DataFiles/MineralInterestTermsDefinitions.pdf. 
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areas relative to nonshale areas. It is possible that school districts and local governments in the 
shale area lowered property tax rates as the tax base expanded, causing the total tax collections to 
return to pre-drilling levels. It is unlikely, however, that this would have occurred before an 
initial tax revenue windfall, which we should observe in our data in the form of greater tax 
payments at some point. 
 The fixed effects model with the log of property taxes paid per acre owned as the 
dependent variable provides little evidence that farmers in the Barnett Shale area began paying 
more taxes compared to those outside the shale as development matured (Table 2). If oil and gas 
right ownership were common among farmers there, we would expect tax payments to increase 
precipitously during peak drilling, since taxes are only assessed once production begins. Yet the 
coefficient on the Shale x Yt interaction actually decreases from 2002 to 2007 when drilling and 
production increased substantially. 
 A similar analysis for the Marcellus is not indicative of the ubiquity of split estates 
because oil and gas rights are not taxed in Pennsylvania.
2
 Indeed, we find that property taxes 
paid by farms on the Pennsylvania side changed little over time relative to properties on the New 
York side. This finding also gives us confidence that the differential appreciation in 
Pennsylvania and New York did not stem from systematic changes in property tax rates or 
assessments.  
 
How does the net effect of development change during the leasing and drilling periods? 
The second question our empirics inform is how the effect of shale gas development changes 
over the leasing and drilling stages of development. For farms in both the Barnett and Marcellus 
                                                 
2
 A 2002 decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the state’s assessment laws to exclude oil and gas 
(Pepe, 2009). 
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Shales, most appreciation occurred with leasing. Little if any additional appreciation occurred as 
wells were drilled and production began.  
In the Barnett, farm real estate values evolved similarly from 1992 to 1997 in shale and 
nonshale areas. Real estate then increased in shale areas relative to nonshale areas in subsequent 
years. The largest period-to-period appreciation occurred from 1997 to 2002 when the coefficient 
on the Shale x Yt interaction went from -0.022 to 0.090, an increase of 0.112 log points. Neither 
of these coefficient estimates, however, are statistically distinguishable from zero. Only the 
Shale x 2012 coefficient is statistically significant and only at the 10 percent level. 
The higher appreciation in the Barnett Shale from 1997 to 2002 corresponds to the period 
when leasing intensified. The weak evidence of additional appreciation from 2007 to 2012 may 
reflect investment of oil and gas wealth into land and buildings. Alternatively, Weber, Burnett, 
and Xiarchos (2014) find that increases in the value of oil and gas rights caused an increase in 
the property tax base in shale areas, helping to increase residential property values in shale areas 
relative to nonshale areas in the Dallas-Fort Worth region. Such increases in local property tax 
revenue may have also contributed to greater appreciation of farm real estate, either through 
greater demand for residential development or through lower property tax rates.  
 As with the Barnett Shale sample, farm real estate values initially evolved similarly in 
Pennsylvania and New York border counties up to 2002. In 2007, when most land would have 
been leased, farm real estate in shale areas appreciated by nearly 50 percent (0.39 log points) 
more than in nonshale areas. The higher values on the Pennsylvania side then persisted through 
2012.  
Our findings suggest that having lease offers in hand matters for landowners to value 
their land and the attached rights. In 2007 and 2008 there was no clear moratorium on fracking in 
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New York. The difference between Pennsylvania and New York around this time was that the 
rush to lease land started in Pennsylvania and only began spilling into New York near the end of 
2007 (Wilber 2012, p. 48).  In spite of property owners in the three New York counties likely 
owning oil and gas rights in the Marcellus Shale similar to their counterparts across the state line, 
less leasing on the New York side as of 2007 caused landowners there to place a low value on 
their oil and gas rights. This suggests that land owners were conservative in reporting of land 
values and did not assign much value to their oil and gas rights without lease offers in hand. 
 
How common are split estates? 
The property tax data suggest that split estates are common in the Barnett. Using quantile 
regressions we provide further evidence that split estates are more common in the Barnett Shale 
than the northeastern part of the Marcellus Shale, though there may be other reasons why the 
effect of shale development is different for the two regions.  
Equation (4) does not control for whether a property has the oil and gas rights attached to 
it. Initially, these rights would have been almost worthless but would then gain tremendous value 
as technology and prices evolved to make drilling in shale profitable. The changing value of 
these rights are embedded in the residual because they vary across properties in the shale area. 
The shale indicator variable does not control for the rights because ownership of them varies 
across farms within the shale group. Quantile regressions permit estimating different effects for 
different quantiles based on a farm’s residual. Quantile regressions with panel data are hard to 
interpret since an observation could change quantiles over time based on its residual. We 
therefore convert our panel data into a cross sectional model of the form:  
(5)   Δ ln(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒)𝑡 =  𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝝀𝟑𝑿𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 
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 where Δ ln(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒)𝑡 = ln(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒)𝑡 − ln(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒)𝑡−1. The vector 
𝑿𝒕−𝟏 includes several property characteristics potentially correlated with appreciation: the 
logarithmic of property taxes paid per acre owned, the log of the total acres owned, an indicator 
variable for whether the farm operator lives on the property, an indicator variable for whether the 
farm had livestock sales, and, as a measure of land quality, the log value of crop production per 
acre in the farm.  
The results in the prior section suggest that shale areas appreciate most during the land 
leasing period of development. For the Barnett sample we therefore specify t-1 as 1997, which is 
prior to when interest in the Shale grew, and t as 2002, when leasing occurred. Leasing in the 
northeastern Marcellus Shale occurred later, so we specify t-1 as 2002 and t as 2007. All of the 
control variables correspond to values in the initial year (t-1). 
 Using the specification in (5), we estimate the difference in appreciation between shale 
and nonshale areas at the 25
th
 quantile (𝜆2
25) by finding the parameters , 𝜆1
25, 𝜆2
25, and 𝜆3
25that 
minimize the sum of the absolute difference between the actual and predicated values, where 
observations with positive residuals are weighted by 0.25 and those with negative residuals are 
weighted by 0.75 (see equation 7.1 on p. 213 in Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). We estimate 
coefficients at the 25
th
, 50
th
 (median), and 75
th
 quantiles and, for comparison, at the mean.  
 The point estimates on the shale variable in the quantiles regressions for the Barnett show 
greater appreciation for farms at the 75
th
 quantile than at the mean or median (Table 3). But, even 
at the 75
th
 quantile the point estimate for the coefficient on the shale variable has a wide 
confidence interval and is not statistically distinguishable from zero. This provides further 
evidence of the ubiquity of split estates. We also note that the estimated shale effect is larger at 
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the 25
th
 quantile than at the mean or median, which does not match our prediction that properties 
with higher than average unobservable characteristics (presumably with the oil and gas rights) 
should appreciate more than other properties. Nonetheless, all of the point estimates for the 
coefficient on the shale variable have wide confidence intervals and are not statistically 
distinguishable from zero.  
 The Marcellus results better match our predictions: the effect of being in the shale area 
(the Pennsylvania side) was largest for farms in the 75
th
 quantile, next largest in the 50
th
 quantile, 
and smallest in the 25
th
 quantile. We observe a statistically significant effect of shale leasing at 
the 75
th
 and 50
th
 quantile and at the mean but not at the 25
th
 quantile based on unobserved 
characteristics. This may mean that the majority of farms in the Marcellus study area own the oil 
and gas beneath them. It could also suggest that resource richness, and therefore interest in 
leasing, is spread fairly uniformly across Tioga, Bradford, and Susquehanna counties. This is 
consistent with maps showing a broad swath of drilling occurring throughout these three 
counties. Drilling in the Barnett Shale counties was less uniform, with more drilling on the side 
of the counties closer to Fort Worth.
3
 
 
How has shale gas development affected the value of rural residence and livestock properties 
relative to other properties?  
As mentioned previously, the value of real estate in livestock farms and residence farms may be 
more sensitive to the disamenities from shale development. We define a livestock farm as one 
reporting more than 75 percent of sales from livestock, with a minimum of $10,000 in livestock 
sales. The USDA has traditionally used a farm typology that groups farms into Residence, 
                                                 
3
 For a map of cumulative natural gas wells drilled in Pennsylvania visit this site at the Energy Information 
Administration: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6390. For the Barnett Shale, visit: 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2170.  
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Intermediate, and Commercial farms. Following this typology, we define a residence farm as any 
farm with less than $250,000 in agricultural sales and whose principal operator does not identify 
farming as their primary occupation and lived on the farm at least once in the census year.
4
 The 
classification of a residence farm does not depend on acreage, so it should not be confused as a 
term for small farms. Large farms with little agricultural production can be termed residence 
farm, while productive small farms would not. We then estimate a modified version of Equation 
(5) augmented with a dummy variable indicating a livestock or residence farm and its interaction 
with the shale dummy variable:  
 
(6.1)   Δ ln(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑡
=  𝜋1 + 𝜋2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜋2𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝜋3(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑥𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖) + 𝝅𝟒𝑿𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
(6.2)   Δ ln(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑡
=  𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜃2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜃3(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖) + 𝜽𝟒𝑿𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 
 
 As in Equation (5), this is a cross-sectional analysis focusing on the difference in the log 
value per acre before and after the leasing period. For the Barnett, t equals 2002 and t-1 equals 
1997; for the Marcellus t equals 2007 and t-1 equals 2002. We estimate equations (6.1) and (6.2) 
separately instead of as a single equation including indicator variables for shale, livestock, 
residence, and their interactions, since we are limited in sample size to farms in both censuses in 
question for each study area. Including all interactions at once would result in just a few farms 
identifying the shale effect for residence livestock farms, for example. 
                                                 
4
 The results are robust to using $100,000 and $50,000 in agricultural sales as alternative cut-offs. 
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The point estimate of the effect of being in the shale was less for livestock farms than for 
other farms in both the Barnett and Marcellus Shale samples (Table 4). In the Barnett, the shale 
effect was negative for livestock properties; for the Marcellus, the effect was positive but smaller 
for livestock farms than nonlivestock farms. In both cases, however, the point estimates are 
statistically insignificant. Less appreciation (or depreciation) over the leasing period for 
properties used to raise livestock instead of grow crops may indicate that livestock farmers are 
less likely to own their oil and gas rights. Alternatively, farmers may perceive that drilling poses 
a risk to the farm’s water, lowering its value as a livestock farm.   
For both the Barnett and Marcellus Shale samples we also find that the effect of being in 
the shale was larger for residence farms than for other farms. The point estimate of the 
coefficient on the Shale x Residence interaction is similar in both cases (0.43 and 0.45), though 
less precise in the Barnett sample (standard error of 0.28 compared to 0.20). The finding is the 
opposite of our prediction that the value of residence farms would be more sensitive to the 
disamenities for drilling (or expected drilling). As with nonlivestock farms, residence farms may 
be more likely to own their oil and gas rights. Perhaps prior interest in oil or gas development 
and therefore splitting of estates, focused on larger tracts of accessible land which is where larger 
farms tend to be located. Alternatively, farmers are potentially less able than residence 
landowners to move away in the event land or water are accidentally contaminated, which may 
make the former less willing to sign leases. 
 
How has shale gas development affected land values in southwestern Pennsylvania where split 
estates are supposedly common?  
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Southwestern Pennsylvania experienced a similar wave of drilling beginning around 2005, 
slightly earlier than in northeastern Pennsylvania. Southwestern Pennsylvania does have a 
history of energy development, which is likely associated with more split estates as in the 
Barnett. We perform a brief analysis on the shale counties of Washington and Greene, which lie 
southwest of Pittsburgh. We chose Beaver and Lawrence counties just northwest of Pittsburgh as 
the most suitable comparison counties. While they are both Marcellus shale counties, only parts 
lie within the high formation pressure area that gives drillers higher production rates. Thus, they 
experienced much lower levels of drilling. Over the 2002 to 2012 period, 87 and 55 wells were 
drilled in Beaver and Lawrence, compared with 2,207 and 2,826 wells in Greene and 
Washington (PA DEP 2014).  
Our fixed effects regression results indicate no significant effect of shale development on 
property values over our study period, only a significant negative effect from 1997 to 2002 
(results not shown). The lack of significant effect otherwise is consistent with the weak effect in 
the Barnett Shale in Texas, where split estates are common. We have no plausible explanation 
for the relative depreciation in the shale counties or appreciation in the non-shale counties from 
1997 to 2002. The quantile regression results are more in line with those in northeastern 
Pennsylvania, where splits estates are uncommon. Combined, our results fit the general 
assessment that split estates are most common in Texas, least common in northeastern 
Pennsylvania, and somewhat common in southwestern Pennsylvania. This gives some credence 
to our method of assessing the prevalence of split estates through a combination of panel fixed 
effects and quantile regression.  
 
Conclusion - What We Have and Have Not Learned from Land Values 
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Shale gas development affects self-reported farm real estate values, indicating that to some 
extent farmers include their oil and gas rights in the market value of their land. Researchers using 
self-reported land values in the 2000s and more recently should be aware that oil and gas right 
ownership and development may cause large changes in values in certain areas and may be 
correlated with variables of interest. Moreover, if land values are conceptually envisioned to 
exclude subsurface rights, then the inclusion of them by respondents implies that land value 
estimates based on reported data will be too. To the extent that the frequency with which farmers 
own their oil and gas rights varies by region – and our findings suggest that it does – differences 
in land values across space may also be biased.  
 Appreciation occurs during the land leasing period, not when most drilling happens. The 
little to no additional appreciation in the drilling period may reflect several competing forces. On 
one hand, investment of royalty income in improvements to land or buildings, greater local 
public revenues and overall greater demand for land should cause appreciation during the peak 
drilling phase. On the other hand, other factors could cause depreciation: well productivity can 
decline exponentially shortly after being drilled and drilling can produce environmental 
disamenities and affect the land’s suitability for the uses that give it value.  
The nature of our data means that we can estimate only the long-term net effect of shale 
development on land values. We do not know if specific channels are at work and, if so, how 
much they contribute to appreciation or depreciation. Isolating the importance of various 
channels would provide a richer description of the effects of development. Land values will 
continue to be interesting to track in coming years as they will reveal how the combined effect of 
the above mentioned causal channels evolve as shale development matures. Our last year of 
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analysis, 2012, was near the Barnett’s peak; production continued to grow after 2012 in the 
Marcellus. 
 The effect of development on property values appears to vary by property type, though 
our samples are too small to provide rigorous and fine-grained breakouts. For both the Barnett 
and the Marcellus we find that residence farm properties appreciated more as land was leased. In 
contrast, for both regions point estimates suggest that livestock farms appreciated less than other 
farms in the shale, though the difference was not statistically significant in either case. This is an 
area fertile for research and one where regional differences will matter. Water scarcity in the 
west may reduce the value of farms dependent on ground or surface water for growing crops or 
raising livestock. In the east, water quality may matter more and mostly for livestock farms since 
most crops are rain-fed. 
 In all of the questions raised, a continued empirical challenge is the lack of data on oil 
and gas right ownership. It remains a glaring omitted variable in any study of property values 
and oil and gas development. This is true for self-reported data or sales data. For self-reported 
data it is necessary to know if oil and gas rights are present and if they are included in the 
reported land value; for sales data, it is important to know if they were initially present and, if so, 
if they were conveyed to the buyer. Our empirics provide indirect evidence that the frequency of 
split estates is more common in the Barnett Shale than in the northeastern part of the Marcellus 
Shale. Ownership may also be correlated with characteristics of the property that make it more or 
less valuable, such as accessibility and distance to urban centers. Ownership data would 
therefore aid in identifying environmental disamenities from drilling apart from changes in oil 
and gas right ownership or valuation.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Texas - Barnett PA/NY - Marcellus 
  Shale Non-Shale PA NY 
Farm Real Estate 
Value  
$/Acre N $/Acre N $/Acre N $/Acre N 
1992 4,295 1,210 3,487 951 2,273 1,176 5,118 426 
1997 5,504 1,566 5,895 1,375 3,331 886 2,953 439 
2002 6,020 1,234 5,658 987 3,572 631 3,378 291 
2007 9,851 10,308 7,334 8,074 4,893 3,353 3,654 1,472 
2012 8,505 6,642 5,879 5,203 4,548 2,571 3,167 1,033 
Property Taxes Paid $/Acre N $/Acre N $/Acre N $/Acre N 
1992 36 1,186 35 941 29 1,173 97 425 
1997 40 1,549 57 1,352 37 885 65 437 
2002 52 1,215 53 959 36 625 67 291 
2007 92 10,055 74 7,876 44 3,253 81 1,435 
2012 69 6,631 52 5,181 46 2,570 54 1,028 
Residence Farms % N %  N % N %  N 
1992 0.323 1,210 0.323 951 0.139 1,176 0.232 426 
1997 0.356 1,566 0.337 1,375 0.269 886 0.296 439 
2002 0.432 1,234 0.411 987 0.333 631 0.289 291 
2007 0.403 10,308 0.371 8,074 0.304 3,353 0.364 1,472 
2012 0.383 6,642 0.375 5,203 0.290 2,571 0.315 1,033 
Livestock Farms    % N %  N % N %  N 
1992 0.265 1,210 0.166 951 0.700 1,176 0.493 426 
1997 0.160 1,566 0.119 1,375 0.430 886 0.278 439 
2002 0.126 1,234 0.094 987 0.325 631 0.237 291 
2007 0.061 10,308 0.060 8,074 0.184 3,353 0.136 1,472 
2012 0.082 6,642 0.078 5,203 0.075 2,571 0.033 1,033 
 
Notes: Only farms observed in at least two Censuses of Agriculture from 1992 to 2012 and that 
received the census questionnaire asking for real estate values are included. Real estate values 
and property taxes are per acre of land owned by the farm. Residence farms are defined as any 
farm with less than $250,000 in agricultural sales and whose principal operator does not identify 
farming as their primary occupation and lived on the farm at least once in the census year. 
Livestock farms are defined as farms reporting more than 75 percent of sales from livestock, 
with a minimum of $10,000 in livestock sales. The increase in the number of farms in 2007 and 
2012 reflects changes in the administration of the Census of Agriculture to collect farm real 
estate values on all versions of the census questionnaire. The high farm real estate value in New 
York in 1992 reflects five high-value outliers, whose influence is mitigated by using a log 
specification in our empirical model.   
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Table 2. Shale Gas Development and Farm Real Estate Appreciation, 1992-2012 
 
Texas - Barnett PA/NY - Marcellus 
Dependent Variable Log(value/acre) 
Log(property tax 
payments/acre) 
Log(value/acre) 
Log(property tax 
payments acre) 
Year=1997 0.199*** 0.128 -0.003 0.115 
 
(0.076) (0.109) (0.063) (0.078) 
Year=2002 0.195** -0.003 0.132* 0.177** 
 
(0.083) (0.127) (0.077) (0.088) 
Year=2007 0.376*** 0.027 0.180*** 0.167** 
 
(0.069) (0.103) (0.065) (0.075) 
Year=2012 0.376*** -0.068 0.291*** 0.210*** 
 
(0.070) (0.105) (0.067) (0.078) 
Shale*(Year=1997) -0.022 -0.299** 0.078 -0.096 
 
(0.099) (0.148) (0.075) (0.092) 
Shale*(Year=2002) 0.090 0.115 0.064 -0.083 
 
(0.109) (0.170) (0.096) (0.108) 
Shale*(Year=2007) 0.066 0.097 0.397*** 0.039 
 
(0.091) (0.136) (0.075) (0.085) 
Shale*(Year=2012) 0.155* 0.105 0.366*** -0.023 
 
(0.092) (0.138) (0.077) (0.089) 
Constant 7.891*** 2.690*** 7.256*** 2.851*** 
  (0.041) (0.061) (0.025) (0.028) 
Model FE FE FE FE 
Number of observations 25,529 24,719 8,904 8,700 
Number of farms 16,151 15,786 5,015 4,935 
Adjusted R Squared 0.016 0.003 0.087 0.009 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by farm in parentheses. 
FE denotes farm-level fixed effects. The excluded year is 1992. In the Pennsylvania – Marcellus 
analysis, the variable Shale equals 0 for the farms in the New York border counties. Although 
they are in the Marcellus Shale, state policy has precluded shale development.  
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Table 3. Shale Gas Development and Appreciation at the Mean and by Quantile 
Dependent variable:  
D.Log(value of land and buildings) 
Texas - Barnett (t=2002, t-1=1997) PA/NY - Marcellus (t=2007, t-1=2002) 
Mean 25th 50th 75th Mean 25th 50th 75th 
Shale (0/1) 0.126 0.290 0.063 0.173 0.182* 0.125 0.162** 0.304*** 
 
(0.137) (0.182) (0.138) (0.138) (0.097) (0.125) (0.077) (0.104) 
L.Log(property tax payments/acre) -0.048 -0.009 -0.035 -0.038 -0.268*** -0.207** -0.147*** -0.165** 
 
(0.051) (0.077) (0.053) (0.058) (0.088) (0.105) (0.055) (0.083) 
L.Log(acres owned) 0.068 0.073 -0.025 -0.011 0.025 0.005 0.029 0.103 
 
(0.046) (0.051) (0.060) (0.057) (0.068) (0.073) (0.054) (0.065) 
L.Live on property (1/0) -0.551*** -0.319 -0.581** -0.895*** -0.152 -0.270* -0.144 -0.016 
 
(0.183) (0.249) (0.236) (0.260) (0.157) (0.142) (0.147) (0.211) 
L.Livestock sales (1/0) -0.485** -0.326 -0.132 -0.154 -0.283*** -0.092 -0.066 -0.417*** 
 
(0.205) (0.252) (0.185) (0.244) (0.105) (0.129) (0.091) (0.135) 
L.Value of crop production/acre -2.342** -0.959 -1.541 -1.766 -0.286 -0.053 0.065 -0.485 
 
(1.043) (1.394) (1.149) (1.142) (0.466) (0.843) (0.621) (0.846) 
Intercept 0.646** -0.444 0.868* 1.483*** 1.521*** 0.059 1.234** 0.270 
  (0.314) (0.410) (0.474) (0.412) (0.547) (0.535) (0.565) (0.530) 
Number of observations 229 229 229 229 390 309 390 309 
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.104 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors for the mean regressions are heteroskedastic robust errors; for the quantile 
regressions they are bootstrapped using 500 replications. This is a cross-sectional analysis. L. designates a five-year lag, D. designates 
the five-year difference difference with different five-year periods chosen for the Barnett and Marcellus depending on the start of the 
leasing period. In the Pennsylvania – Marcellus analysis, the variable Shale equals 0 for the farms in the New York border counties. 
Although they are in the Marcellus Shale, state policy has precluded shale development.
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Table 4. Shale Gas Development and Appreciation by Property Type 
Dependent variable: 
D.Log(value of land and buildings) 
Texas - Barnett 
(t=2002, t-1=1997) 
Pennsylvania - Marcellus 
(t=2007, t-1=2002) 
Shale 0.005 0.248 0.052 0.247** 
 
(0.189) (0.174) (0.111) (0.122) 
L.Log(property tax payments/acre) -0.054 -0.057 -0.304*** -0.291*** 
 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.087) (0.091) 
L.Log(acres owned) 0.066 0.053 -0.011 0.018 
 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.069) (0.075) 
L.Live on property (1/0) -0.385* -0.433** -0.099 -0.183 
 
(0.217) (0.204) (0.161) (0.153) 
L.Livestock sales (1/0) -0.496** -0.494** -0.341*** -0.190 
 
(0.233) (0.240) (0.105) (0.116) 
L.Value of crop production/acre -2.334* -2.064* -0.314 -0.410 
 
(1.197) (1.238) (0.489) (0.578) 
L.Residence farm -0.270 
 
-0.467*** 
 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.160) 
 L.Shale*Residence farm 0.430 
 
0.450** 
 
 
(0.280) 
 
(0.200) 
 L.Livestock farm 
 
0.367 
 
-0.057 
 
 
(0.290) 
 
(0.190) 
L.Shale*Livestock farm 
 
-0.499 
 
-0.177 
  
(0.318) 
 
(0.195) 
Constant 0.620 0.576 1.521*** 1.234** 
 
(0.405) (0.403) (0.547) (0.565) 
Number of observations 229 229 390 390 
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.054 0.132 0.120 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. This is a cross-
sectional analysis. L. designates a five-year lag, D. designates the five-year first difference with 
different five-year periods chosen for the Barnett and Marcellus depending on the start of the 
leasing period. In the Pennsylvania – Marcellus analysis, the variable Shale equals 0 for the 
farms in the New York border counties. Although they are in the Marcellus Shale, state policy 
has precluded shale development. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Study Regions and Counties 
 
31 
 
 
Figure 2. Shale Gas Development, 1997-2012 
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection; New York Department of Environmental 
Conservation; Railroad Commission of Texas.  
Note: Only unconventional wells are considered, which are those wells drilled in unconventional formations (the 
Barnett Shale in Texas and the (mostly) Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania). For Pennsylvania and New York, the 
year corresponds to the year when the well was drilled. For Texas, the year corresponds to when the well permit was 
approved, excluding permits that were never drilled. The TX Shale and Nonshale Counties and the PA Shale and 
NY Control Counties correspond to the counties in the map in Figure 1. 
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